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TWIN PILLARS OF JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY:
THE IMPACT OF THE GINSBURG
COLLEGIALITY AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION
PRINCIPLES ON HER SEPARATE OPINIONS
INVOLVING GENDER DISCRIMINATION
Rebecca L. Barnhart* & Deborah Zalesne**
The role of a judge is “to persuade . . . not pontificate.”1 Ruth
Bader Ginsburg made this statement in a Madison Lecture she
gave at New York University in 1992, shortly before her appoint-
ment to the U.S. Supreme Court.2 In it she addressed the necessity
for collegiality among judges and the adverse impact that separate
opinion writing can have on this imperative.
She contrasted the British tradition of individual judging with
the continental institutional mode of judging, expressing a clear
preference for the latter.3 Under the British tradition, separate and
individual opinions are rendered by each judge, with each expres-
sing her or his individual convictions and perspectives.4 The conti-
nental or civil law tradition calls for more moderation and
restraint. Under this tradition, typified in France and Germany,
judgments are collective and any disagreement is not published.5
The U.S. Supreme Court, originally directed toward institutional
opinion-making under Chief Justice John Marshall,6 has metamor-
phosed into a system with a single institutional opinion of the
Court, and with no limit on the prerogative of individual judges to
express their differing views in separate opinions.7
* J.D. candidate, 2005, City University of New York School of Law. B.A., 1992,
Bryn Mawr College.
** Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. B.A., 1988, Wil-
liams College; J.D., 1992, University of Denver College of Law; LL.M., 1997, Temple
University School of Law. The authors would like to thank Professors Jeffrey
Kirchmeier and Ruthann Robson for their insightful comments and suggestions on
an earlier draft. We would also like to thank Dawn Williams for her invaluable assis-
tance with research.
1 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1186
(1992) [hereinafter Judicial Voice].
2 Id. at 1185 n.1.
3 Id. at 1189.
4 Id.
5 Id. “Cases are decided with a single, per curium opinion, generally following a
uniform anonymous style.” Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 1189-90.
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Justice Ginsburg’s partiality for the institutional mode of judg-
ing stems from her belief that overindulgence in separate opinion
writing threatens the collegiality of the Court, thereby damaging its
reputation and diminishing the respect accorded to its decisions.
She notes that “[r]ule of law virtues of consistency, predictability,
clarity, and stability may be slighted when a court routinely fails to
act as a collegial body.”8 The resulting loss of respect engendered
by the unfettered authorship of dissents, she posits, may ultimately
result in the forfeiture of judicial power.9 Notably, Justice Gins-
burg’s collegial approach to decision-making may be gender-based.
While qualities of aggressiveness, strength, competitiveness and in-
dependence have typically been construed as masculine in nature,
stereotypically feminine traits include more collegial, passive and
nurturing behavior.10
According to Justice Ginsburg, the collegiality of the Court is
threatened by two distinct tendencies: “too frequent resort to sepa-
rate opinions and the immoderate tone of statements diverging
from the position of the Court’s majority.”11 In substance, Justice
Ginsburg defends dissent writing when it serves to enlighten.12 The
most effective dissent, she believes, is supported by its own legal
analysis—“it spells out differences without jeopardizing collegiality
or public respect for and confidence in the judiciary.”13 She cau-
tions that even “‘the Great Dissenter,’ Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, in fact dissented less often than most of his colleagues,”14
and she subscribes to Justice Brandeis’ view that “it is more impor-
8 Id. at 1191.
9 Id.
10 See Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Professional Roles, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 44
(1994). While Professor Rhode recognizes that these values are “traditionally associ-
ated with women,” she eschews “sweeping claims about woman’s essential nature,”
noting that “women’s voice speaks in more than one register; its expression depends
heavily on the social circumstances and cross-cutting affiliations of the speaker, in-
cluding not only gender but class, race, ethnicity, age, and sexual orientation.” Id.
11 Judicial Voice, supra note 1, at 1191.
12 Justice Ginsburg has discussed the importance of dissents in our legal system in
sharpening majority opinions. She often recounts how Justice Scalia came to her
chambers to show her a draft of his dissent in the United States v. Virginia case. He told
her, “Ruth, you’re not going to like this . . . but I want you to have my dissent as early
as I can give it to you so you’ll have time to respond.” Justice Ginsburg has said that
her majority opinion was “ever so much better because of his stinging dissent.”
Jonathan Ringel, Ginsburg Lifts High Court Curtain on Clerk Roles, Working with Scalia,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Feb. 21, 2003; see also Kelly Kesner, Justice Ginsburg Q & A
with Students, THE DOCKET, Vol. 12 No. 5 (March 2003).
13 Judicial Voice, supra note 1, at 1196.
14 Id. at 1191 (citing Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A
History of Judicial Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 202 (1959)).
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tant that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right.”15
In style, she believes a dissent should be measured and moder-
ate. The tendency of gratuitous and vociferous dissents displaces
the proper focus on legal issues and becomes little more than an
exercise in playground bullying and name calling. Quoting Roscoe
Pound, Justice Ginsburg cautions that it is “ ‘not good for public
respect for courts . . . for an appellate judge to burden an opinion
with intemperate denunciation [of the writer’s] colleagues, violent
invective, attributions of bad motives to the majority of the court,
and insinuations of incompetence, negligence, prejudice, or ob-
tuseness of [judges who subscribe to the majority opinion].’”16 She
agrees with Judge Collins J. Seitz, that such language “does nothing
to further cordial relationships on the court.”17
Potentially at odds with her philosophy on collegiality and ju-
dicial restraint is Justice Ginsburg’s deep loyalty to advancing wo-
men’s legal rights. As director of the ACLU Women’s Rights
Project from 1971 to 1980,18 Ruth Bader Ginsburg was the leading
litigator in the area of gender discrimination. She authored or
coauthored nine briefs,19 six of which she argued before the Su-
preme Court,20 and she participated in the writing of fifteen amici
curiae briefs.21 Her pioneering work has made a lasting imprint on
gender jurisprudence.
This Article examines the inherent tension between the colle-
gial court philosophy embraced by Justice Ginsburg, and her own
position on gender discrimination. This tension is likely exagger-
ated in light of the divisiveness of the Court and the frequent five-
to-four votes on the issue of gender discrimination. Within the
framework of her Supreme Court dissents and concurring opin-
ions on gender discrimination, this Article explores whether Jus-
15 Id. (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
16 Id. at 1194 (quoting Roscoe Pound, Cacoethes Dissentiendi: The Heated Judicial Dis-
sent, 39 A.B.A. J. 794, 795 (1953)).
17 Id. at 1195 (quoting Collins J. Seitz, Collegiality and the Court of Appeals, 75 JUDICA-
TURE 26, 27 (1991)).
18 Amy Leigh Campbell, Raising the Bar: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the ACLU Women’s
Rights Project, 11 TEX. J. WOMEN & LAW 157, 158 (2002); see also Deborah L. Markowitz,
In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman’s Work to Change the Law, 11 WOMEN’S RT. L. REP. 73
(1989).
19 Melanie K. Morris, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Gender Equality: A Reassessment of Her
Contribution, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L. J. 1, 4 & n.20 (2002).
20 Carey Olney, Better Bitch Than Mouse: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Feminism, and VMI, 9
BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 97 n.1 (2000-2001).
21 Morris, supra note 19, at 4 & n.22 (citing cases).
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tice Ginsburg has been able to maintain dual fidelity to the bulwark
of collegiality, i.e., restraint in separate opinion writing, and to her
gender postulate. Or, in the alternative, has Justice Ginsburg aban-
doned the possibly gender-based goal of collegiality in the highly
politicized and contentious arena of gender discrimination, partic-
ularly as her colleagues have increasingly engaged in individual
opinion writing? Consequently, the Article examines not only
whether and when Justice Ginsburg has chosen to dissent or con-
cur, but also the style and substance of her separate opinions.
Part I of the Article examines Justice Ginsburg’s career as a
litigator and her deep commitment to the eradication of gender
discrimination. Part II considers her thirteen-year tenure as a cir-
cuit court judge for the District of Columbia and her reputation as
a pragmatic, centrist judge concerned with consensus-building and
collegiality. Part III completes the survey of her career with a study
of her voting patterns as a Supreme Court justice in cases involving
gender discrimination. Specifically, this Part explores whether her
collegiality philosophy has led her to adopt a more moderate ap-
proach to gender issues, overlooking relatively minor differences
with her more conservative colleagues.
The Article ultimately concludes that the dual objectives of
gender equality and collegiality need not be mutually exclusive. In-
deed, as evidenced by Justice Ginsburg’s separate opinions, these
two goals can coexist as a substantial force in advancing the law.
I. GINSBURG THE ADVOCATE: REPUTATION AS
GENDER DISCRIMINATION PIONEER22
Justice Ginsburg’s gender and jurisprudential philosophies de-
fined her strategy as an advocate. She worked for the achievement
of gender equality, not for women’s rights per se.23 While this dis-
22 Because the focus of this Article is the impact of Justice Ginsburg’s gender and
judicial philosophies on her Supreme Court decision-making in the area of gender
discrimination, this Part is intended merely to orient the reader as to her gender
philosophy. For more in-depth treatment of her gender discrimination work as an
advocate, see Deborah L. Markowitz, Ruth Ginsburg: Women’s Rights Advocate–Supreme
Court Justice, 20 VT. B. J. & L. DIG. 9 (1994); Markowitz, In Pursuit, supra note 18;
Campbell, supra note 18, at 157; Toni J. Ellington et al., Comment, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Gender Discrimination, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 699 (1998).
23 Joyce Ann Baugh et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Preliminary Assessment, 26 U.
TOL. L. REV. 1, 28 (1994); Morris, supra note 19, at 23; see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Constitutional Adjudication in the United States As a Means of Advancing the Equal Stature of
Men and Women Under the Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 263, 266 (1997) [hereinafter Consti-
tutional Adjudication] (noting that “[m]y major work . . . was to help advance the
vibrant idea of the equal stature and dignity of men and women as a matter of consti-
tutional principle”).
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tinction may be dismissed by some as a matter of semantics, it is
fundamental to her strategy as a lawyer, and to this day, it informs
her decisions as a jurist. This distinction identifies Justice Ginsburg
more with egalitarian feminists who advocate the complete elimi-
nation of gender-based classifications in the law, and who regard
special-treatment laws as divisive precisely because they exacerbate
differences and inequality between the sexes.24 Justice Ginsburg
strove to demonstrate that laws differentiating on the basis of sex
and whose rationale relied solely on the stereotypical roles that
men and women play in society are discriminatory in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.25 Consequently, Justice Ginsburg’s
strategy was often to choose male litigants harmed by statutes cre-
ated to protect women in order to educate the Supreme Court
about the theory that even benign legislation based on gender
roles is unfairly and unconstitutionally discriminatory.26
Justice Ginsburg’s jurisprudential philosophy had equal im-
pact on her litigation strategy. Her respect for stare decisis and her
belief that it is the most dependable means by which to ground
courts’ decisions was the primary reason that she chose to disman-
tle discriminatory laws incrementally, in a step-by-step approach.27
She believed that the only prospect for success lay in slowly chip-
ping away at the notion that laws based on gender classifications
were constitutional because they either benefited women or did
not harm either sex. Undoing centuries of gender discrimination
required a reorientation of the Court’s thinking; overnight success
would lack the solid precedential value necessary to preserve these
victories.28 As discussed below, both Justice Ginsburg’s equality
doctrine and her conservative approach to litigating not only had
impact on her work as an advocate, but also continue to inform her
decision-making on the Supreme Court.29
Justice Ginsburg’s first victory as a litigator for gender equality
occurred even before the ACLU established the Women’s Rights
Project. In its seminal decision in Reed v. Reed,30 the Supreme Court
extended the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to sex-based classifications for the first time.31 Reed chal-
24 See Olney, supra note 20, at 118-19.
25 Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 23, at 269-70.
26 Baugh et al., supra note 23, at 26.
27 Id. at 25.
28 Morris, supra note 19, at 4.
29 See infra Part III.
30 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
31 See Campbell, supra note 18, at 177.
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lenged an Idaho statute that appointed men over women as
administrators of estates even when both parties were equally quali-
fied.32 The Reeds were separated and their son had committed sui-
cide.33 In her brief, Ginsburg asserted that the Idaho statute failed
to pass even rational basis review because Ms. Reed was just as qual-
ified as her husband to administer her son’s estate.34 However, she
also challenged the Court to adopt strict scrutiny review for sex-
based classifications, by demonstrating that such classifications re-
lied on an immutable characteristic, often bearing no relationship
to ability, as the basis for differential treatment. Such distinctions
were thus a form of invidious discrimination contrary to the equal
protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.35 Although
the Court did not apply a higher level of scrutiny to sex-based clas-
sifications, Ginsburg had planted the seed, and the Reed brief
would become known as the “Grandmother Brief” because it con-
tained the legal arguments for all subsequent gender discrimina-
tion cases.36
Frontiero v. Richardson37 was Ginsburg’s next victory. Sharron
Frontiero was an Air Force lieutenant who was not automatically
granted housing and medical benefits for her husband even
though the Air Force automatically granted the same benefits to
married male personnel.38 Ginsburg pushed for the application of
strict scrutiny to all sex-based classifications, but at the same time,
introduced another level of scrutiny.39 Four justices embraced the
application of strict scrutiny to all sex-based classifications,40 but
without the majority necessary to make it law, Ginsburg moved
away from strict scrutiny toward another level of heightened re-
view, which the Court later named intermediate scrutiny.41
The Supreme Court finally accepted Ginsburg’s invitation to
32 Reed, 404 U.S. at 73.
33 See Campbell, supra note 18, at 169.
34 See id. at 170.
35 Id.
36 James A. Kushner, Introducing Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Predicting the Performance of
a Ginsburg Court, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 181, 183 (2003).
37 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
38 Id. at 680.
39 Campbell, supra note 18, at 188.
40 Justices Douglas, Marshall, and White signed on to Justice Brennan’s opinion
for the Court. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
Powell, and Blackmun concurred in the judgment. Id. at 691 (Powell, J., concurring).
41 Olney, supra note 20, at 114; Sheila M. Smith, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Sexual Harassment Law: Will the Second Female Supreme Court Justice Become the Court’s
Women’s Rights Champion?, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1893, 1902 (1995).
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craft a new intermediate scrutiny test with Craig v. Boren.42 Relying
on earlier decisions invalidating sex-based classifications that were
“an inaccurate proxy for other, more germane bases of classifica-
tion,”43 Justice Brennan struck down an Oklahoma statute prohibit-
ing the sale of beer to men under twenty-one, but not to women of
the same age. The Court specifically recognized that differential
treatment resting on arcane and overbroad notions of men’s and
women’s roles is hostile to the Equal Protection Clause.44 Without
going so far as to say that sex-based classifications were immediately
suspect, the Court held that for a sex-based classification to survive
review, there must be an important governmental interest, and the
classification must be substantially related to that interest.45
Since Craig v. Boren, intermediate scrutiny has been the rubric
under which the Court has evaluated gender discriminatory laws.46
However, after joining the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg hinted
42 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
43 Id. at 198.
44 Id. In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), Justice Ginsburg also suc-
ceeded in convincing the Court that a social security statute that allowed women but
not men to automatically claim survivor benefits was an impermissible sex classifica-
tion that ignored women’s active role in the workforce and disqualified men solely on
the basis of sex in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Michael James Confusione, Jus-
tice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Thurgood Marshall: A Misleading Comparison, 26
RUTGERS L. J. 887, 891 (1995).
45 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
46 As with many tests fashioned by the Supreme Court, controversy surrounds what
actually is the test for intermediate scrutiny. Much of the debate focuses on the addi-
tional “exceedingly persuasive” language, which first appeared in Pers. Adm’r of Mass.
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) and which Justice O’Connor made an integral part
of intermediate scrutiny in Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
However, the Justices themselves, the lower courts, and academics cannot agree as to
whether “exceedingly persuasive” is simply a restatement of the traditional two-prong
test or whether it is an additional requirement. See Olney, supra note 20, at 144; Mor-
ris, supra note 19 at 15-17; Ellington et al., supra note 22, at 754-55. Justice Ginsburg
herself has contributed to the confusion in her landmark decision, United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (VMI), which held that Virginia’s exclusion of women
from the military school violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Justice Ginsburg’s coining of “skeptical scrutiny” in place of intermedi-
ate scrutiny and her reliance on the phrase “exceedingly persuasive” led Justice Scalia
to assert that she was attempting to ratchet intermediate scrutiny closer toward strict
scrutiny, long reserved for race-based discriminatory laws. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 570-75
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing ambiguous language in place of the traditional lan-
guage destabilizes current doctrine). Chief Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand,
used his concurrence to insist that the Hogan standard had not changed, and thus,
intermediate scrutiny remained intact. See id. at 558-59 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Academics have argued whether the standard did indeed change. See, e.g., Morris,
supra note 19, at 17-21; Olney, supra note 20, at 139; Ellington et al., supra note 22, at
700. Justice Ginsburg’s muddying of the gender discrimination jurisprudence is ironic
when one considers that what often prompts her to write is the need for clarification.
See Heather L. Stobaugh, Comment, The Aftermath of United States v. Virginia: Why Five
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that she is interested in reopening a dialogue on this subject.47 Re-
gardless of the future path of gender jurisprudence, it owes its life-
blood, at least in part, to the pioneering work of Justice Ginsburg,
who challenged the Court to recognize that the legal relegation of
women to secondary class status violates the letter and the spirit of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a
moment of perfect symmetry, Justice Ginsburg, sitting on the very
Court before which she had vigorously argued that differential
treatment on the basis of sex is anathema to the Constitution, was
able to put her imprimatur on the majority opinion for United
States v. Virginia (“VMI”).48
II. GINSBURG THE JUDGE: REPUTATION AS
CONSENSUS-BUILDING MODERATE
When President Bill Clinton nominated Ruth Bader Ginsburg
to fill Justice White’s seat on the Supreme Court, she, like most
nominees, was unknown outside the legal community. Ginsburg
had, however, been a circuit court judge for the District of Colum-
bia for thirteen years.49 Justice White’s retirement offered the first
Justices are Pulling in the Reins on the “Exceedingly Persuasive Justification,” 55 SMU L. REV.
1755 (2002); Judicial Voice, supra note 1, at 1185.
47 See Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 26 n.* (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring) (illustrating that Justice Ginsburg has not entirely abandoned the goal of mov-
ing the Court toward a recognition of sex-based classifications as inherently suspect).
48 518 U.S. 515 (1996). VMI was a landmark case challenging single-sex military
education. Id. at 519. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Court refused to credit the
State’s first justification—diversity of educational opportunities—for maintaining
VMI as a single-sex institution. Id. at 539. Justice Ginsburg highlighted Virginia’s his-
tory of refusing to admit women to male academic institutions for much longer than
many other states, to demonstrate that this stated goal’s origin was not long-standing,
but rather in response to Mississippi v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). Id. at 537-39. The
Court also rejected the State’s second justification for excluding women: their need
for a cooperative learning atmosphere, rather than VMI’s adversarial method of train-
ing. Id. at 540-42. The State’s goal of preserving the kind and caliber of training was
not furthered by the outright exclusion of women and thus the exclusion of women,
which relied on generalizations concerning women’s interests and abilities, failed in-
termediate scrutiny. Id. at 540-46. The Court then turned to Virginia’s “separate but
equal” solution of a parallel program for women. Id. at 526. It held that the Virginia
Women’s Military Institute for Leadership did not meet the equal protection stan-
dards because the female facility was not substantially equal to VMI. Id. at 555. Justice
Ginsburg proposed that “ ‘[i]nherent differences’ between men and women, we have
come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the
members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity.” Id.
at 533. She explained further that “generalizations about ‘the way women are,’ esti-
mates of what is appropriate for most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to
women whose talent and capacity place them outside the average description.” Id. at
517.
49 President Clinton formally announced Justice Ginsburg’s nomination June 14,
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opportunity for a Democrat president to nominate a Supreme
Court justice since Lyndon Johnson had appointed Thurgood Mar-
shall.50 With the conservative White’s retirement, legal experts pre-
dicted that a more liberal justice could provide a crucial swing vote
on issues ranging from abortion to the death penalty to job
discrimination.51
In announcing Ginsburg’s nomination to the Supreme Court,
President Clinton highlighted her roles as an attorney and a judge,
describing her both as a women’s rights pioneer, and as a consen-
sus-building moderate,52 which he saw as an asset for the fractious
Court.53 Thus, the gendered dichotomy was immediately set in
place between the zealous advocate of women’s rights and the fem-
inine conciliator with a dependable track record on the D.C. Cir-
cuit. The press ran with it, either confirming or attacking these
labels. The flurry of newspaper articles on then-Circuit Judge Gins-
burg immediately following her nomination uniformly labeled her
moderate or centrist in stark contrast to her career as a women’s
rights advocate.54 The media characterized her simultaneously as a
“pioneer” and a “centrist,”55 “trailblazing lawyer” and “non-ideolog-
ical,”56 “innovative” and “pragmatic,”57 and a “pioneer” and a “dis-
passionate judge.”58
1993 in the Rose Garden of the White House, following a lengthy search lasting nearly
three months. Ruth Marcus, Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg Named to High Court: Clinton’s
Unexpected Choice Is Women’s Rights Pioneer, WASH. POST, June 15, 1993, at A1. Justice
Ginsburg was appointed appellate judge to the D.C. Circuit by President Jimmy Carter
in 1980. Jill Abramson, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Long Has Spent Her Career Overcoming the
Odds, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1993, at A8.
50 Marcus, supra note 49.
51 Paul M. Barrett, Ruth Ginsburg: The Swing Vote of the Future?, WALL ST. J., June 30,
1993, at B1.
52 Joan Biskupic, Judge Ruth Ginsburg Named to High Court; Nominee’s Philosophy Seen
Strengthening the Center, WASH. POST, June 15, 1993, at A1.
53 Marcus, supra note 49.
54 See, e.g., Stefan Fatsis, Ginsburg’s Record Shows Will to Examine Both Sides, THE JOUR-
NAL RECORD, June 17, 1993, available at 1993 WL 9728306 (characterizing her as a
trailblazing women’s rights lawyer with a nonideological bent); Abramson, supra note
49 (labeling Justice Ginsburg as the “godmother of legal feminism” while also calling
her “moderate”). She has been described alternatively as “cautious technician,” Na-
than Lewin, Top Court Needs a Maverick, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 27, 1993, at 5, and
“careful, nondogmatic, pragmatic, consensus builder, methodical, and attentive to
precedent.” John Flynn Rooney, Ginsburg Lauded For Her Demeanor, Intellect, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., June 15, 1993, at 1.
55 Marcus, supra note 49.
56 Fatsis, supra note 54.
57 Biskupic, supra note 52.
58 Paul M. Barrett, Justices’ Shifting Views Mark 1992-93 High-Court Term, WALL ST. J.,
June 30, 1993, at B1.
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Most journalists failed, however, to notice the similarities be-
tween Ginsburg the lawyer and Ginsburg the jurist, choosing in-
stead to accept that pioneer lawyer and centrist judge were
mutually exclusive.59 The pioneer lawyer had always worked under
the radar and chosen mundane cases to push forward gender
equality law. According to one commentator, while Ginsburg’s the-
ory was radical, her approach was conservative and incremental
with cases carefully chosen to show irrational disparate treatment
of women solely on the basis of gender.60 Thus, moderation and
caution were her trademarks long before she joined the bench.61
Personal descriptions revealed, not surprisingly, an individual
of contradictions.62 Although she was labeled a swing vote on the
D.C. Circuit, Professor Alan Dershowitz, in one of the most inter-
esting and germane assessments in light of Justice Ginsburg’s own
collegiality philosophy, believed she would prove to be anything
59 One exception to the superficial coverage was Steven Roberts et al., Two Lives of
Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Crusader in the ’70s; Centrist Judge After That, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., June 28, 1993, at 26, 28, available at 1993 WL 6871318. This article took note of
Justice Ginsburg’s conservative legal strategy as a pioneer lawyer. Despite the authors’
more nuanced analysis, the title of the article demonstrates that they, too, saw a sea
change from crusader to conservative jurist. Id.
60 Id.
61 Moderation has been a consistent trait of Justice Ginsburg and is one of her
guiding principles concerning a judge’s role and the importance of collegiality. Nev-
ertheless, the mainstream media sought to categorize her moderation in judicial deci-
sion-making through political labels, such as conservative versus liberal, thus relying
on political ideologies, rather than judicial philosophies, to explain her judicial deci-
sions or perceived position on social issues. See, e.g., Biskupic, supra note 52; Marcus,
supra note 49; Cal Thomas, In Ginsburg, Her Nomination “Is About as Good as We’ll Get,”
ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 17, 1993, at A15, available at 1993 WL 5794453; Pilita Clark,
Woman Is U.S. Court Pick, THE AGE, June 16, 1993, at 9, available at 1993 WL 12365274.
These labels make little sense, however, as applied to Justice Ginsburg, who refuses to
prejudge a case based on her own belief system, even though she is a self-confessed
feminist. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, New York Law School Law Review Dinner February 12,
1999, Remarks, 44 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 7, 8 (2000). For Justice Ginsburg’s own descrip-
tion of her judging style during her Supreme Court confirmation hearings, see Lewin,
supra note 54 (quoting Justice Ginsburg that “ ‘[j]ustice is not to be taken by storm.
She is to be wooed by slow advances.’”); Olney, supra note 20, at 131-33 (relating
Justice Ginsburg’s plea to be “judged as a judge, not an advocate”); Baugh et al., supra
note 23, at 7-10 (relating Justice Ginsburg’s comment in her opening statement to the
Committee at her confirmation hearing that her approach to judging is neither con-
servative nor liberal, rather she is committed to judicial restraint).
62 For articles discussing Ruth Bader Ginsburg the person, see generally Margaret
Carlson, The Law According to Ruth, TIME, June 28, 1993, at 38, 40 (pointing out her
“natural reserve” and “shyness”); Guy Gugliotta & Eleanor Randolph, A Mentor, Role
Model and Heroine of Feminist Lawyers, WASHINGTON POST, June 15, 1993, at A14 (noting
that “[s]he cares . . . about the real world and the effect her rulings will have,” and
describing her as “totally disarming,” and a “stickler for details”); Biskupic, supra note
52 (describing her as “plain vanilla” and “remote”); Roberts et al., supra note 59
(describing her as “picky,” “demanding,” “sarcastic,” “intimidating,” and “a loner”).
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but a consensus-builder.63 In fact, Professor Dershowitz took a
veiled swipe at her for her friendship and admiration for Justice
Scalia.64 However, Justice Ginsburg’s professional and personal as-
sociation with Justice Scalia,65 an unabashed conservative, arguably
undermines Professor Dershowitz and other detractors’ argument
that she is immoderate and prickly. For his part, Justice Scalia re-
portedly said he would choose Justice Ginsburg as his companion
on a desert island.66 The spectrum of support and respect for Jus-
tice Ginsburg ran the gamut from Robert Bork, another former
colleague and arch-conservative, describing her as “thoughtful”
and “careful,”67 to the then-president of the Center for Reproduc-
tive Law and Policy in New York, analogizing Justice Ginsburg’s
work in gender equality law to Thurgood Marshall’s race equality
work.68 Justice Ginsburg’s wide-ranging friendships seemed to con-
firm a collegial attitude and ability to separate ideology from the
person. Moreover, garnering the respect of such a disparate group
within the legal field is testimony to an eclectic and open mind in
keeping with Justice Ginsburg’s philosophy of collegiality.
III. GINSBURG THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE: FIDELITY
TO BOTH HER GENDER POSTULATE AND
HER COLLEGIALITY PRINCIPLE
In considering Justice Ginsburg’s voting patterns on the Su-
preme Court in cases involving gender discrimination and the ex-
tent to which they have been influenced by a desire to avoid
writing separate opinions, Part III of this Article examines not only
what prompts her to write separately, but also the form and sub-
stance of her writing. Given her commitment to collegiality, and
thus carefully circumscribed use of separate opinion writing, this
Part addresses the question of whether her collegiality philosophy
has given way to her commitment to gender equality in the law.
63 Alan Dershowitz, Choice of Ginsburg Raises Many Questions, BUFF. NEWS, June 17,
1993, at B3, available at 1993 WL 6097164 (citing Justice Ginsburg’s colleagues who
described her as difficult and alienating).
64 Id. (stating “she has been compared to Justice Scalia, whom she admires and
likes”).
65 Justices Ginsburg and Scalia served together on the D.C. Circuit. Gugliotta &
Randolph, supra note 62, at A14.
66 Carlson, supra note 62, at 40.
67 Abramson, supra note 49, at A8.
68 Id.
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A. Separate Dissent
At of the end of the 2001-02 term, Justice Ginsburg had au-
thored forty-nine dissents, slightly above the Court’s average in
every term except one.69 As illustrated by these dissents, her strong
regard for precedent is perhaps the foremost reason for expressing
disagreement with the Court.70 Justice Ginsburg’s adherence to
precedent pushes her to illustrate the majority’s disregard71 or
even misapplication of precedent.72 Her incremental approach to
the law prompts her to be critical of overbroad results that reach
further than the facts of the case at hand73 or that fudge the facts
to match prior precedent.74 Although conservative in her applica-
tion of the law, Justice Ginsburg is hardly a blind follower of stare
decisis; she demands only that when the Court breaks with past
decisions, it does so in a forthright, definite manner75 and with
strong support.76
The strictures that apply in deciding to write separately also
pervade the form and substance of Ginsburg dissents. A conserva-
tive approach is equally applicable to her mantra of no “spicy” dis-
sents.77 Her dissents remain collegial by observing a respectful and
restrained tone toward her colleagues,78 never blatantly chastising
or name calling, choosing to concentrate on the themes of prece-
dent and its proper application, rather than a direct onslaught on
the majority’s reasoning.79 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg tends to err
on the side of brevity, favoring a narrow focus.80
69 Laura Krugman Ray, Justice Ginsburg and the Middle Way, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 629,
654 (2003).
70 Id. at 655-56.
71 Id. at 655.
72 Baugh et al., supra note 23, at 21.
73 Ray, supra note 69, at 655.
74 Id. at 657.
75 Id. at 656.
76 Id. at 658.
77 Id. at 656 (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Styles of Collegial Judging: One Judge’s Per-
spective, 39 FED. B. NEWS & J. 199, 201 (1992)); see also Judicial Voice, supra note 1, at
1194 (explaining that she questions “resort to expressions on separate opinions that
generate more heat than light”).
78 Ray, supra note 69, at 668.
79 Id. at 671 (generally preferring more cryptically muted criticism, such as
describing an opinion as “‘puzzling’” or “‘enigmatic’”). Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420
(1998), discussed infra at Part III(A)(1), does not appear to fit within this rubric.
80 Baugh et al., supra note 23, at 24.
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1. Miller v. Albright 81
The sole issue addressed by Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, in Miller v. Albright,
was whether the requirement of additional proof of paternity im-
posed by 8 U.S.C.A. § 1409(a)(4) on citizen fathers of illegitimate
children born abroad but not on citizen mothers, violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.82 A majority of
the Court affirmed the District Court for the District of Columbia’s
dismissal of the petitioner daughter’s case; however, a splintered
Court prevented a decision as to the constitutionality of Section
1409.83
The Court was sharply divided, as reflected in the plurality
opinions upholding on various grounds the Court of Appeals deci-
sion. The opinions ranged from that of Justice Stevens, which held
that Section 1409(a)(4) survived intermediate scrutiny review,84 to
Justices O’Connor’s and Kennedy’s concurring opinion finding
that Miller lacked standing to assert a gender discrimination claim
and thus the statute survived rational basis review,85 to the opinion
of Justices Scalia and Thomas, arguing that the Court did not have
power to grant the requested relief.86 Justice Stevens, applying the
intermediate scrutiny test,87 held that the paternity requirement
was substantially related to the important governmental interests of
ensuring a blood relationship between the citizen parent and child
and of fostering a parent-child relationship, as well as ties between
the child and the United States.88 The disparity of treatment was
not based on impermissible and outdated stereotypes, but rather
on legitimate biological differences between mothers and fathers
that did not make them similarly situated.89 The paternity require-
ment for citizen fathers was therefore neither arbitrary nor
irrational.90
If ever there were a compelling reason for Justice Ginsburg to
81 523 U.S. 420.
82 Id. at 428.
83 Id. at 445. The constitutionality of § 1409 was later decided in Nguyen v. INS, 533
U.S. 53 (2001), discussed infra at Part III(B)(1).
84 Miller, 523 U.S. at 441.
85 Id. at 451-52 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
86 Id. at 453 (Scalia, J., concurring).
87 Interestingly, Justice Stevens never once identified the applicable test or ac-
knowledged that statutes differentiating on the basis of sex are subject to “heightened
scrutiny.”
88 Miller, 523 U.S. at 436, 438.
89 Id. at 444-45.
90 Id. at 424.
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write separately, Miller is the paradigm, for it concerned gender
discrimination, which occupied a large part of Justice Ginsburg’s
professional career, and the majority opinion flew in the face of
precedent, shaped to a large extent by Justice Ginsburg. As she
noted in her dissent, “Section 1409 is one of the few provisions
remaining in the United States Code that uses sex as a criterion in
delineating citizens’ rights.”91 Indeed the existence of a facially dis-
criminatory statute seemed to make Section 1409 a dinosaur on a
certain path to extinction.92 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent bore her
trademarks: a focused critique and fidelity to gender equality pre-
cedent. In style and tone, however, it is surprising in its biting criti-
cism;93 she seems to have chosen to engage in a less collegial
dialogue with some of her colleagues, namely Justices Stevens and
Rehnquist, while, on the other hand, working in tandem with Jus-
tices Breyer and Souter.94
If Justice Ginsburg truly eschews separate opinion writing, one
might ask why she wrote a separate dissent, rather than simply join-
ing Justice Breyer’s. Although she might have incorporated her ar-
guments into Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion, the focus of their
two dissents is entirely different, and they may have decided that
one lengthy dissent would have carried less weight than two sepa-
rate attacks on the plurality opinions. Moreover, the scope of Jus-
tice Breyer’s opinion was far broader, addressing Justice
O’Connor’s standing argument, Justice Scalia’s lack of relief
stance, and finally the intermediate scrutiny analysis by Justice Ste-
vens.95 Paramount in Justice Ginsburg’s decision to write separately
must have been her conviction that the majority had broken with
precedent and had erroneously applied the rules of gender
jurisprudence.
Justice Ginsburg, however, chose an extremely narrow focus,
concentrating on the history of citizenship laws, which traditionally
discriminated against citizen mothers, and the Court’s gender ju-
risprudence under which Section 1409 could not have survived had
intermediate scrutiny been properly applied.96 Justice Ginsburg ad-
dressed the historical discrimination toward citizen mothers in na-
tionality and citizenship laws to broadside the government’s
91 Id. at 461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
92 Stobaugh, supra note 46, at 1756-57.
93 See infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
94 Justice Ginsburg, along with Justice Souter, signed on to Justice Breyer’s dissent.
Miller, 523 U.S. at 471 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
95 See generally id. at 471-90 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 460-71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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explanation for the gender distinction–i.e., the close relationship
between mother and child.97 She methodically deconstructed the
statute, starting with the premise that “distinctions based on gen-
der trigger heightened scrutiny and ‘[i]t is unlikely . . . that any
gender classifications based on stereotypes can survive heightened
scrutiny.’”98 Another nod to collegiality was her incorporation of
Justice Breyer’s dissent, which addressed the statute’s unconstitu-
tional classification on the basis of gender.99
As the Court’s expert on gender jurisprudence, Justice Gins-
burg might have been expected to author the lead dissent; how-
ever, she has consistently shown restraint when the Court has
addressed gender discrimination cases.100 Justice Ginsburg’s dis-
sent is reminiscent of her litigation. She illustrated the impermissi-
ble reliance on stereotypes–mothers, not fathers, raise illegitimate
children–which do not apply to all individuals and the use of gen-
der as an impermissible proxy for better solutions.101 Justice Gins-
burg directly challenged the reasons behind the gender
classification and was openly skeptical of the government’s prof-
fered explanations.102 She reasoned that promoting close ties be-
tween a foreign-born child and the United States could be
achieved without reference to gender.103
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent is most notable for the tone she
adopted in addressing Justice Stevens’ opinion. It is one of her
most direct attacks on a colleague’s opinion, setting this dissent
apart from her norm, which ranges from characterizing her col-
leagues’ reasoning as puzzling104 to burying criticism in foot-
notes.105 In fact, Justice Ginsburg’s practice is to reserve mildly
acerbic retorts106 for her majority opinions. In Miller, however, she
pointedly referenced the majority’s belief that Section 1409 was a
benign classification to illustrate the irony of that observation in
light of the discriminatory nature of nationality laws toward wo-
97 Id. at 468 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice O’Connor’s concurring
opinion). Justice Ginsburg’s use of Justice O’Connor’s language is a collegial gesture
and cleverly points out that Justice O’Connor stands on the same side of the issue
although she concurred on other grounds.
99 Id.
100 Ray, supra note 69, at 644.
101 Miller, 523 U.S. at 460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 468 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 470 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
104 Ray, supra note 69, at 649.
105 Id. at 672.
106 Id. at 648.
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men,107 and to remind the Court that benign discrimination can-
not save a statute whose objective could be served by gender
neutral criteria.108 Instead of masking criticism of her colleagues,
she boldly chastised Justice Stevens’ embrace of societal stereo-
types109 as constitutionally impermissible. She even sarcastically
quoted his take on a mother’s connection to her child,110 and then
lambasted the government’s use of the mother-child relationship
to justify differential treatment when in fact the country historically
did not respect this bond.111
In concluding, Justice Ginsburg spoke directly to Congress as a
coequal partner, challenging it to rectify Section 1409’s gender
bias.112 Engagement of other branches is an important component
of Justice Ginsburg’s collegiality ideology.113 While her decision to
write separately was an affirmative statement of her reasoning,
faithful to her regard for precedent, it arguably did not conform to
her guiding principle of moderation and restraint.
2. Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District 114
In one of four sexual harassment cases decided by the Su-
preme Court in the 1997-98 term, the Court took up the issue of
employer liability in the context of teacher-student sexual harass-
ment. Victims of sexual harassment experienced the biggest set-
back in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, where Justice
O’Connor, writing for the majority, held that a plaintiff is not enti-
tled to damages for teacher-student sexual harassment unless a
school district official with authority to institute corrective mea-
sures has actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the
107 Miller, 523 U.S. at 460-61 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 469 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg noted that “[t]hese gener-
alizations pervade the opinion of Justice Stevens, which constantly relates and relies
on what ‘typically,’ or ‘normally,’ or ‘probably’ happens ‘often.’” Id. (citation
omitted).
110 Id. at 468 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that “as Justice Stevens puts it, a
mother’s presence at birth, identification on the birth certificate, and likely ‘initial
custody’ of the child give her an ‘opportunity to develop a caring relationship with
the child.’”).
111 Id.
112 Id. at 471 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that “Congress recognized this
equality principle in 1934, and is positioned to restore that impartiality before the
century is out.”).
113 Judicial Voice, supra note 1, at 1186 (noting that judges engage “in a dialogue
with, not a diatribe against, co-equal departments of government”).
114 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
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teacher’s misconduct.115
In that case, Alida Star Gebser, a high school student, was sub-
jected to a campaign of sexual innuendo and provocation by her
teacher.116 She ultimately had an affair with the teacher that lasted
for a year; Gebser never reported the incidents to anyone, includ-
ing her parents, because “she was uncertain how to react and she
wanted to continue having him as a teacher.”117 The affair was
eventually discovered and the teacher was fired and arrested.118
Gebser sued under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972,119 which bars sex discrimination at educational institutions
receiving federal funds. Although Titles VII and IX had been anal-
ogized in the past to determine liability for sexual harassment, the
Court abandoned the analogy and departed from the clear law
under Title VII in a 5-4 decision, holding that the school district
was not liable for sexual harassment because no one with authority
to take corrective action had actual notice of the harassment.120
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, joined by Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, criticized the majority’s “dramatic
departure” from well-settled principles of agency law.121 He rea-
soned that under agency principles, the school district would be
liable for the teacher’s misconduct because it was the agency rela-
tionship that made the tort possible by giving the teacher such
powerful influence over Gebser.122 Justice Stevens also highlighted
the paradoxical result of the Court’s ruling that school employees
are now better protected from sexual harassment than are students
at the same school. In fact, practically speaking, in some instances
where even the principal of the school does not have authority to
take corrective action, a harassed student may be required to re-
port any instances of sexual harassment to the school board in or-
der to take advantage of the protections of Title IX.123 Finally,
Justice Stevens pointed out that the majority’s ruling actually en-
115 Id. at 290.
116 Id. at 277-78.
117 Id. at 278.
118 Id.
119 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2004).
120 Gebser, 524 U.S. 274, 290-91 (1998).
121 Id. at 300-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 298-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 219(2)(d) (1957)).
123 Id. at 301 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that “[i]ndeed, the rule that the Court
adopts would preclude a damages remedy even if every teacher at the school knew
about the harassment but did not have ‘authority to institute corrective measures on
the district’s behalf.’”).
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courages schools to turn their backs on sexual harassment alto-
gether as a means of avoiding liability.124 He noted that the ruling
has taken away the incentive to have an anti-harassment policy, ef-
fectively putting the responsibility on a thirteen-year-old student
for reporting an incident, rather than putting the responsibility on
the school or the teacher.125
Because of Justice Stevens’ distinct concern for consistency
with Title VII and with adherence to common law agency princi-
ples, it is within character that Justice Ginsburg signed on to the
dissent. She did, however, also offer a brief independent dissent, in
which Justices Souter and Breyer joined. Her dissent took Justice
Stevens’ dissenting opinion one step further to resolve the issue of
whether a school district should be relieved of liability if it has a
sexual harassment policy in place, recognizing an effective, ade-
quately publicized policy for reporting and redressing sexual har-
assment as an affirmative defense to a Title IX sexual harassment
claim.126 This dissent is characteristically narrow in focus and mod-
erate in style and tone. Three paragraphs long, her dissent reflects
her desire to clarify an important issue left open by the lead dis-
sent, without detracting from its force. Justice Ginsburg’s concen-
tration on this single unresolved issue is a typical manifestation of
collegiality yielding to individuality. She believes that the Court’s
role is not only to follow and interpret precedent faithfully, but
also to create new case law when presented with an issue on which
the lower courts require guidance. For Justice Ginsburg, the insti-
tutional function of the Court is as vital as the underlying substan-
tive law.
B. Collaborative Dissent
In Justice Ginsburg’s view, the role of a justice is to nurture
collaboration through restraint.127 Thus, when egotism or the tug
of individuality is the motivating force behind a dissent, it should
124 He states:
The reason why the common law imposes liability on the principal in
such circumstances is the same as the reason why Congress included the
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex in Title IX: to
induce school boards to adopt and enforce practices that will minimize
the danger that vulnerable students will be exposed to such odious be-
havior. The rule that the Court has crafted creates the opposite
incentive.
Id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 307 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
127 Judicial Voice, supra note 1, at 1186.
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be avoided.128 As such, a collaborative dissenting effort serves the
dual goals of decrying the majority’s lack of attention to precedent
while preserving the noncompetitive atmosphere of the bench. Ac-
cordingly, Justice Ginsburg has not always chosen to author an in-
dependent dissent, even when gender principles are at stake.
1. Nguyen v. INS 129
Three years after Miller, the constitutionality of Section
1409(a) was squarely addressed in Nguyen v. INS.130 Justice Ken-
nedy’s opinion for the majority upheld one of the last gender dis-
criminatory statutes.131 In light of nearly thirty years of Supreme
Court precedent striking down sex-based classifications rooted in
overbroad generalizations, the ruling took academics and women’s
rights advocates by surprise.132
Nguyen was the son of an American father and a Vietnamese
mother. His father raised him in Vietnam and then the United
States but never formally legitimated Nguyen, one of the means by
which a child born out of wedlock and abroad to a citizen father
and noncitizen mother may satisfy the paternity requirement of
Section 1409(a)(4).133 As a lawful permanent resident, Nguyen was
eligible for deportation following conviction for a felony. The
Board of Immigration Appeals rejected Nguyen’s citizenship claim
because he had not complied with Section 1409(a)’s statutory re-
quirements. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, he argued that Section 1409(a) violated the Equal Protection
Clause by treating similarly situated children differently depending
on the sex of the citizen parent. The circuit court rejected his
claim, and the Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari, this time
putting the legitimacy of Section 1409(a) squarely before the
128 See Ray, supra note 69, at 655; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Sepa-
rately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 141 (1990) (referring to “the competing tugs of collegial-
ity and individuality”).
129 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
130 Id.
131 Justice Kennedy’s authorship of the Nguyen opinion is especially puzzling given
that he joined Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Miller regarding § 1409. See Miller v.
Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 451-52 (1998) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
132 See, e.g., Mary-Christine Sungaila, Nguyen v. INS and Sex Stereotyping in Citizenship
Laws: Building on the Equal Protection Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 10 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN’S STUD. 293, 301 (2001) (noting that Nguyen was not the “cakewalk” that eve-
ryone had anticipated it would be).
133 As with Miller, § 1409(a)(4) is the only subsection addressed by the Court; the
constitutionality of § 1409(a)(3), which imposes a financial support requirement on
citizen fathers but not citizen mothers, thus raising an equal protection claim, has not
been reached by the Court. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 431; Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 60.
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justices.134
Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice Kennedy135 held that
the more strenuous citizenship requirements of Section
1409(a)(4)136 for children born out of wedlock and abroad to a
citizen father and noncitizen mother did not violate the equal pro-
tection guarantee embedded in the Fifth Amendment.137 The ma-
jority found that (1) ensuring that a biological parent-child
relationship exists, and (2) promoting the opportunity for a genu-
ine parent-child relationship with ties between the child and par-
ent and by extension the United States, were important
governmental interests,138 and that the statutory means chosen to
achieve these interests were substantially related to the governmen-
tal purpose.139 Thus, the statute satisfied intermediate scrutiny.
Justice O’Connor authored the dissent on behalf of four jus-
tices,140 none of whom authored an additional dissenting opinion.
Because Nguyen implicates an area on which Justice Ginsburg holds
acknowledged and adamant legal views, it is worth inquiring as to
why she did not write a dissent as well. Nguyen is not the first gen-
der discrimination case where she has remained silent;141 however,
it is remarkable for its rather blatant disregard, even misapplica-
tion, of precedent,142 which is traditionally one of the factors moti-
vating a Ginsburg dissent.143 Justice Ginsburg’s silence is perhaps
most appropriately explained by her equally strong fidelity to col-
legiality. Having already authored one of the dissents in Miller, she
134 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 56.
135 Justice Kennedy’s authorship of the majority opinion is seemingly in direct con-
flict with his position at the time of Miller, when he joined Justice O’Connor’s opin-
ion, which concurred in the judgment but found that petitioner lacked standing to
bring a gender-based equal protection claim. Justice O’Connor hypothesized that it
was unlikely that “any gender classifications based on stereotypes can survive height-
ened scrutiny.” Miller, 523 U.S. at 452 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
136 When the child’s father is the American citizen, he must take one of three steps
before the child’s eighteenth birthday in order for the child to claim citizenship: legi-
timization, declaration of paternity under oath, or a court order of paternity. Nguyen,
533 U.S. at 62.
137 Id. at 73.
138 Id. at 63, 64-65.
139 Id. at 70.
140 Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined her dissent. Id. at 74 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
141 See, e.g., discussion of J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), infra at
Part III(D)(1).
142 Justice O’Connor lambasted the majority for giving lip service to intermediate
scrutiny, but in reality applying rational basis review. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 74-75
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
143 Ray, supra note 69, at 655-57.
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deferred to Justice O’Connor’s opinion addressing these same is-
sues in Nguyen, which allowed Justice O’Connor to incorporate the
major points of Justice Ginsburg’s earlier dissent. Moreover, be-
cause Justice Ginsburg’s collegiality philosophy restrains her from
confronting justices head-on, she may have made a strategic deci-
sion that Justice O’Connor could deliver a more forceful attack on
the majority opinion than she herself felt comfortable doing.144
And finally, a single dissenting opinion would carry more weight,
particularly if authored by the most conservative of the dissenters,
and a member of the plurality majority in Miller.
The substance of Justice O’Connor’s dissent incorporated Jus-
tice Ginsburg’s gender jurisprudence, thus mitigating the necessity
for a separate opinion. The dissent was a strong endorsement of
the Ginsburg gender doctrine, reading like a Ginsburg brief in its
recitation of precedent to illustrate the majority’s misapplication,
even disregard of the Court’s own prior decisions.145 The dissent
eviscerated the moorings of the majority opinion. It attacked its
failure to accurately apply intermediate scrutiny by essentially ig-
noring the “exceedingly persuasive” language component from
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan146 and United States v. Vir-
ginia (VMI).147 It also maintained that sex-based classifications may
not rely on overbroad generalizations based on outdated notions
of the roles of men and women, and that the government’s justifi-
cations for these classifications must be genuine, not a post-hoc
product of litigation strategizing.148 The dissent demonstrated that
the statute impermissibly relied on the stereotype that women take
primary responsibility for childrearing149 and this stereotype, in
fact, reinforced the lack of responsibility men assume when a child
144 The style of the Nguyen dissent is forcefully direct, as demanded by such a bold
divergence with Supreme Court gender jurisprudence, but this is not a style with
which Justice Ginsburg is traditionally comfortable. In light of the majority’s possible
agenda to turn its back on invalidating gender discrimination, the members of the
dissent may have decided the occasion called for a less diplomatic tone. In particular,
the last paragraph of the dissent unabashedly criticized the legal analysis of the major-
ity opinion: “[n]o one should mistake the majority’s analysis for a careful application
of this Court’s equal protection jurisprudence concerning sex-based classifications.”
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 97 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
145 See Stobaugh, supra note 46, at 1757 (arguing that the majority in Nguyen reined
in the use of the VMI “exceedingly persuasive justification” language).
146 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
147 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 74-77 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (the
dissenting Justices chastised the majority for applying rational basis review, instead of
the required intermediate scrutiny).
148 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 74-76 (O’Connor, J. dissenting).
149 Id. at 86 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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is born out of wedlock.150
Justice O’Connor further criticized the majority for
“gloss[ing] over the crucial matter of the burden of justifica-
tion.”151 The first prong of the intermediate scrutiny test demands
that the government provide an important governmental interest
to justify its use of a sex-based classification. In other words, the
government carries the burden. In altering the language to an im-
personal construction,152 the majority lessened the government’s
burden, thereby setting the precedent of an alternative and lower
standard for intermediate scrutiny.153 Justice O’Connor also fo-
cused on gender-neutral alternatives to the sex-based classification,
which the majority acknowledged existed but did not see as fatal to
Section 1409’s constitutionality.154 Requiring that the parent be
present at the birth or have knowledge of the birth were examples
of such gender-neutral alternatives.155 Furthermore, the means-
end test was not met where the purported government objective of
close ties between parent and child was not substantially furthered
by requiring proof of such opportunity before the child’s eight-
eenth birthday, and such relationships did exist even without ob-
taining such proof.156 Moreover, the nexus was further weakened
by the fact that some mothers never develop a relationship with
their children due to abandonment or other tragedies.157
Justice Ginsburg might have furthered her effort to have gen-
der regarded as a suspect classification in a separate opin-
ion–something she hinted at in VMI and Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc.158 Or, if this option was not in line with her views on judicial
conservatism/moderation, she might have highlighted the major-
ity’s betrayal of precedent in misapplying intermediate scrutiny
150 Id. at 92 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor buttressed her argument
with the legislative history of § 1409 where the citizenship status of illegitimate chil-
dren was tied to the mother because they stood in the shoes of the father. Id. at 91-92
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). This is, of course, in stark contrast to the traditional legal
position that women could not transmit U.S. citizenship to children born abroad. See
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 463 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
151 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 78 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
152 Id. at 60 (stating that “[f]or a gender-based classification to withstand equal pro-
tection scrutiny, it must be established . . .”) (emphasis added).
153 Id. at 78 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining that “the Court’s use of the
impersonal construction might represent a mere elision of what we have stated ex-
pressly in our prior cases. Here, however, the elision presages some of the larger fail-
ings of the opinion.”).
154 Stobaugh, supra note 46, at 1771.
155 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 86 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 84-86 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 86 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
158 510 U.S. 17, 26 n.* (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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and cursory acknowledgment of the “exceedingly persuasive” lan-
guage, or she could have addressed the reasons behind the major-
ity’s masked usage of rational basis.159 However, these points
apparently did not outweigh the need for collegiality as expressed
by a single dissent.160
C. Separate Concurrence
If it is true, as one commentator has stated, that a concurrence
presents a less compelling justification for writing separately than a
dissent,161 it is interesting to note that at the end of the 2001-02
term, Justice Ginsburg had authored more concurrences than dis-
sents during her tenure.162 This figure is even more remarkable
when broken down by term, which places Justice Ginsburg above
the Court’s average in five out of her nine terms.163
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrences seem to follow certain
precepts. Notably, she does not engage in a lengthy regurgitation
of the majority opinion.164 Rather, she strikes out on her own legal
footing to limit or expound on the Court’s holding in order to
prevent its future misuse or misapplication and to raise open ques-
tions that she feels the majority opinion should have addressed.165
Her vision is therefore turned toward the horizon of future
cases.166 While Justice Ginsburg thus appears to employ concur-
rences as a tool of clarification, her reasons for writing are not al-
ways evident.167 In fact, the brevity of her concurrences, another
Ginsburg trait,168 sometimes contributes to the confusion concern-
ing their meaning.
159 Stobaugh, supra note 46, at 1772.
160 Moreover, Justice O’Connor incorporated the major themes of Justice Gins-
burg’s Miller dissent: the history of discrimination against women in laws governing
the transmission of citizenship; the lack of fit between purpose and means; and the
impermissible reliance on stereotypes that may hold true for most women but not for
all women. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 88-91 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
161 Ray, supra note 69, at 673.
162 Between Supreme Court terms 1993-2001, Justice Ginsburg wrote fifty concur-
rences, one more than the number of her dissents. Id. at 673-74.
163 Id. at 674.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 674-75.
166 Id. at 674.
167 See discussion of Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), infra at
Part III(C)(2).
168 Ray, supra note 69, at 674.
298 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:275
1. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.169
In 1993, the Supreme Court, by unanimous opinion, clarified
the parameters of a hostile work environment sexual harassment
claim in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,170 holding that for actionable
sexual harassment, the plaintiff need not show that the conduct
caused a tangible psychological injury.171 Under Harris, courts must
evaluate the totality of the circumstances, consider the frequency
of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it was physically
threatening or humiliating, or whether it unreasonably interfered
with an employee’s work.172
Without specifically rejecting the reasonable woman standard
applied by the Harris trial court, and without directly addressing
the debate, the Court applied the reasonable person test, holding
that the conduct must be so “severe or pervasive” that a “reasona-
ble person” would find it, and the plaintiff did find it, hostile or
abusive.173 The Court left the form of the objective test unresolved,
“leaving lower courts wondering whether or not the Court had im-
plicitly rejected the gender-based reasonableness standard.”174
In a short concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg clarified what
she acknowledged was implicit in the majority opinion: the “in-
quiry should center, dominantly, on whether the discriminatory
conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s work per-
formance.”175 She used the term “reasonable person” in her con-
currence, reaffirming her approval of the majority’s reliance on
that test.176 Additionally, she asserted in a footnote that “it remains
an open question whether ‘classifications based upon gender are
inherently suspect.’”177
Her concurrence is clear and to the point, acknowledging that
her view seems to be “in harmony” with the majority’s opinion,178
but giving added guidance to lower courts for making the proper
determination of whether a hostile work environment exists. But
simply clarifying a point that is implicit in the majority opinion is
169 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
170 Id. at 21-22.
171 Id. at 22.
172 Id. at 23.
173 Id. at 22.
174 Smith, supra note 41, at 1935.
175 Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
176 Id.
177 Id. at 26 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 724 & n.9 (1982)).
178 Id.
2004] TWIN PILLARS OF JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY 299
not typically a sufficient basis for a Ginsburg concurrence.179 She
tends only to encroach on her collegiality principle and write sepa-
rately to clarify points of confusion in the lead opinion, to deline-
ate precisely the parameters of the Court’s opinion, or to provide
additional guidance to lower courts on issues left open by the ma-
jority. The substance of this concurrence in Harris reaches beyond
these reasons. Thus, a closer look at her possible intentions is in
order.
Through her comment in the footnote about whether sex-
based classifications are immediately suspect, Justice Ginsburg
“subtly laid the groundwork for future reconsideration of the ques-
tion whether the Equal Protection [C]lause protects against gen-
der discrimination as strongly as it protects against racial
discrimination.”180 Because the case was decided under Title VII,
rather than under the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Ginsburg’s
decision to raise the application of strict scrutiny to sex-based clas-
sifications was already an aggressive legal stratagem. Also, by imply-
ing that sex should be declared a suspect classification entitled to
the same scrutiny as race-based classifications, her comment chal-
lenged years of settled gender jurisprudence analyzed under the
intermediate scrutiny test.181 Accordingly, she made a measured
choice not to argue this point directly, but artfully raised the issue
indirectly in a footnote.
The Harris footnote, in its attempt to reopen the debate on
whether sex is a suspect classification, was an especially ground-
breaking maneuver for Justice Ginsburg, who normally does not
advocate the reevaluation of a settled issue.182 However, even in
making this assertive step, Justice Ginsburg retained her quintes-
sential characteristics of moderation and collegiality. She framed
the issue indirectly in terms of gender as a suspect classification,183
rather than directly attacking the analysis of classification under
the less strenuous intermediate scrutiny test, which surely would
have caused much rancor on the Court.
179 See Ray, supra note 69, at 674-75.
180 Christopher Smith et al., The First-Term Performance of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
78 JUDICATURE 74, 79 (1994).
181 Norman T. Deutsch, Nguyen v. INS and the Application of Intermediate Scrutiny to
Gender Classifications: Theory, Practice, and Reality, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 195 (2003) (stat-
ing that since 1982, intermediate scrutiny has been the consistent standard of review
for a majority of the Supreme Court).
182 See supra text accompanying note 15.
183 Harris, 510 U.S. at 26 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 & n.9 (1982)) (stating that “it remains an open question
whether ‘classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect’”).
300 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:275
Since Justice Ginsburg was already compromising her collegi-
ality views by writing separately on other issues, it is unclear why
she did not also take the opportunity to express her view on the
parameters of the objective test, an issue conspicuously ignored by
the majority. The circuit courts were conflicted about the standard
for determining the existence of a hostile or abusive work environ-
ment. Courts were split as to whether to make that determination
from the perspective of a reasonable person or that of a reasonable
woman, given that the vast majority of sexual harassment claims are
brought by women.184 At first blush, Justice Ginsburg might be ex-
pected to advocate for the reasonable woman standard. While the
so-called neutral reasonable person test provides a universal stan-
dard, many commentators and some courts believe that it actually
contains unstated assumptions that are male-based.185 The reasona-
ble woman standard, conversely, includes women’s experiences “in
a system with asymmetrical power relations that has historically ex-
cluded women’s participation.”186
Arguably, however, the reasonable woman test is antithetical
to Justice Ginsburg’s egalitarian philosophy, favoring the complete
elimination of gender-based classifications. “Undeniably, the rea-
sonable woman standard is asymmetric; it is premised on an ex-
plicit gender distinction and calls for non-identical treatment of
men and women.”187 The difference in treatment is implicitly
based on the premise that men and women have different perspec-
tives regarding what conduct constitutes sexual harassment and
that women are more likely to be offended by certain workplace
conduct than are men. This presumption perpetuates the stereo-
type that women are more emotional and more sensitive than men
184 See, e.g., Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying
reasonable person test); Waltman v. Int’l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 476 (5th Cir. 1989)
(applying reasonable person test); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311,
1316-17 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying reasonable person test); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co.,
805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying reasonable person test); Ellison v. Brady,
924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying reasonable woman test); Andrews v. City of
Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1482-83 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying “minority employee” test).
185 See, e.g., Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879; Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482-83; Naomi R. Cahn,
The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice,
77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992); Sally A. Piefer, Comment, Sexual Harassment from the
Victim’s Perspective: The Need for the Seventh Circuit to Adopt the Reasonable Woman Stan-
dard, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 85, 86 (1993); Lynn Dennison, Note, An Argument for the Rea-
sonable Woman Standard in Hostile Environment Claims, 54 OHIO ST. L. J. 473 (1993).
186 Cahn, supra note 185, at 1401.
187 Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sex-
ual and Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & LAW 95, 108 (1992).
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and therefore need greater protection.188 The reasonable woman
standard is also essentialist in nature, wrongly presuming that there
is just one female perspective, typically that of the white, middle-
class woman. Thus, the reasonable woman standard “may perpetu-
ate existing inequalities based on race, class, sexual orientation and
other factors when it fails to consider the point of view of subordi-
nated groups other than women.”189
Presumably, if Justice Ginsburg had disagreed with the major-
ity’s use of the reasonable person standard, she would have so indi-
cated in her concurrence. Instead, she subtly reaffirmed the
majority’s use of the test by repeating the phrase “reasonable per-
son” in her concurrence.190 Because the reasonable woman stan-
dard differentiates women from men, in contravention of her
belief that even benign differences in treatment of women ulti-
mately harm women and their plight for equal treatment in the
workplace, her failure to push for the reasonable woman standard
is wholly consistent with her agenda.
2. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth 191
In two other sexual harassment cases decided during the 1997-
98 term, the Supreme Court resolved a split in the circuit courts
over the correct standard for holding employers liable for the sex-
ual harassment of an employee by a supervisor. In Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, the Court addressed the issue in the context of a hostile
work environment claim,192 whereas in Burlington Industries v. El-
lerth, the Court addressed the issue based on a claim of quid pro
quo sexual harassment.193
188 Smith, supra note 41, at 1935.
189 Deborah Zalesne, The Intersection of Socioeconomic Class and Gender in Hostile Hous-
ing Environment Claims Under Title VIII: Who is the Reasonable Person?, 38 B.C. L. REV.
861, 879-80 (1997).
190 Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
191 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
192 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998). This case involved a
lifeguard who was subjected to repeated and uninvited offensive touching, sexual
comments and gestures and threatening sexual requests by her two male supervisors.
Id. at 782. Her employer, the City of Boca Raton, asserted that it could not be held
responsible for hostile work environment harassment that occurred at a remote loca-
tion and which, although reported to an intermediate supervisor, was never reported
to higher-ups in the city. Id. at 782-85.
193 Burlington, 524 U.S. at 742. Burlington involved a claim that the plaintiff’s super-
visor repeatedly implied that her job would be in jeopardy unless she succumbed to
his advances. Id. at 748. Her employer, Burlington Industries, argued it should not be
held liable because she suffered no job consequences (she actually was promoted
before she quit), and because she failed to utilize the company’s sexual harassment
complaint procedure. Id. at 749.
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In considering these two cases, the Court determined first that
the distinction between hostile work environment and quid pro
quo harassment did not control the issue of employer liability.194
The Court then held that under either type of claim, employers are
potentially liable for their supervisors’ misconduct, whether or not
the company was aware of the misconduct.195 Specifically, an em-
ployer will be held strictly liable to a victimized employee who has
an actionable claim of sexual harassment against a supervisor who
has authority over the employee, when the exercise of supervisory
authority results in tangible employment action, such as discharge,
demotion, or undesirable reassignment to the plaintiff.196 When
the plaintiff cannot prove tangible employment action, the em-
ployer can raise the affirmative defense that it exercised reasonable
care to prevent and to promptly correct any sexually harassing be-
havior, and that the complaining employee unreasonably failed to
take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities pro-
vided by the employer.197
Six justices, including Justice Ginsburg, signed on to Justice
Souter’s Faragher opinion, with only Justices Thomas and Scalia dis-
senting.198 In Burlington, Justice Kennedy garnered a six-justice ma-
jority, with Justice Ginsburg concurring in the judgment only.199
Again, Justices Thomas and Scalia were the lone dissenters.200
Justice Ginsburg’s Burlington concurrence is characteristically
short at a mere two sentences, but uncharacteristically vague. Her
entire concurrence reads as follows:
I agree with the Court’s ruling that “the labels quid pro quo and
hostile work environment are not controlling for purposes of
establishing employer liability.” I also subscribe to the Court’s
statement of the rule governing employer liability, which is sub-
stantively identical to the rule the Court adopts in Faragher v.
Boca Raton.201
For Justice Ginsburg to weaken a seven-to-two decision by writing
separately, one would expect deeply held principles to be at stake,
yet she fails to articulate her objections to the majority’s reasoning.
Why Justice Ginsburg wrote separately in this instance is in-
194 Id. at 754.
195 See id. at 765.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 810-11 (1998) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
199 Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 766 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
200 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
201 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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deed puzzling, as her concurrence is unfaithful to her collegiality
principle, with no countervailing conviction to explain the depar-
ture. As noted, Justice Ginsburg will typically write separately in or-
der to clarify ambiguities or vague points, or to correct a
misapplication of precedent.202 Her Burlington concurrence does
neither.203 She proceeds to muddy the water with respect to an oth-
erwise solid majority opinion, by failing to articulate any precise
objections.
The majority opinion rests primarily on the rule that, if super-
visors create a hostile work environment, employers are strictly lia-
ble where there is tangible harm to the plaintiff, but only
vicariously liable where the plaintiff suffers no tangible harm.204
Perhaps Justice Ginsburg opposed the application of agency princi-
ples, preferring instead a rule of strict liability for the employer in
all cases. Strict employer liability is more in line with traditional
Title VII doctrine, and accounts for the power supervisors typically
have to adversely affect an employee’s working terms or condi-
tions.205 This interpretation of her concurrence fails, however, as
Justice Ginsburg purported to agree with the rule applied by the
majority. If she does, indeed, agree with the rule, one could as-
sume she disagrees with the majority’s reasoning. But this is conjec-
ture, because she does not clearly so indicate. Furthermore, if she
disagrees with the reasoning, she is not successful in pushing the
law forward, as her objections are unclear.206
D. Collegial Alliance with Majority
Even where a case raises issues of gender discrimination, Jus-
tice Ginsburg does not compromise her fidelity to collegiality and
moderation without good reason. Nowhere is this more evident
than in several prominent gender discrimination cases, where Jus-
tice Ginsburg signs on to the Court’s opinion without concurring.
On certain notable occasions, Justice Ginsburg chose not to speak
202 See supra notes 70-72 & 167-69 and accompanying text.
203 See Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 766 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
204 Id. at 765.
205 Before the Burlington and Faragher cases were decided, this reasoning led one
commentator to predict that Justice Ginsburg would take this position. See Smith,
supra note 41, at 1942. Smith predicted that “[u]nless courts are willing to find vicari-
ous liability without requiring notice to the employer, Justice Ginsburg will reason,
many valid sexual harassment claims will be denied a remedy, and the intent of Title
VII to assure a workplace free from discrimination may be frustrated.” Id.
206 Notably, Justice Ginsburg signed on to the majority opinion in Faragher, leaving
the question of why she did not concur in that case as well. Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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out, despite the presence of principles that guided her in breaking
with her colleagues in past cases. While inductive analysis of Justice
Ginsburg’s inaction calls for a more hypothetical discussion than
her action would have required, it is nonetheless instructive to con-
sider what prompted her to remain a silent member of the majority
in those cases.
While her decisions in some cases may seem to evidence acqui-
escence to institutional pressures and forfeiture of her gender
equality principles, a more nuanced analysis often reveals a deep
allegiance to her collegiality postulate, and concern for the prece-
dential weight afforded to a majority opinion. These decisions are
also consistent with her incremental approach to decision-making,
as she may have questioned the timing of raising more radical
issues.
1. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B
During Justice Ginsburg’s first term, a gender discrimination
case, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., was on the docket.207 The case
challenged the use of peremptory strikes based on gender on the
ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause.208 The Court
ruled six-to-three that a juror’s gender was a constitutionally imper-
missible reason for dismissal.209 This decision was entirely consis-
tent with the Court’s rulings over the past two decades, recognizing
that gender could not be a proxy for a more competent and indi-
vidualized analysis of a person.210 As the first equal protection gen-
der discrimination case before Justice Ginsburg in her first term on
the Court, J.E.B. received heightened scrutiny from women’s rights
groups and legal commentators.211 Based on her public stand re-
garding absolute equality of the sexes, some questioned whether
she would continue to advocate on the bench. Justice Ginsburg
chose to remain silent, joining the majority opinion authored by
Justice Blackmun.212
J.E.B. was the putative father of a child born out of wedlock.213
The State of Alabama, on behalf of the mother, T.B., brought a
paternity suit in the District Court of Jackson County, Alabama.214
207 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
208 Id. at 129.
209 Id. at 128.
210 See id. at 139 n.11.
211 Baugh et al., supra note 23, at 26-27.
212 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 128.
213 See id. at 129.
214 Id.
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During voir dire, the State used nine of its ten peremptory chal-
lenges to dismiss potential male jurors.215 Subsequent to the jury
finding J.E.B. to be the father and the court entering an order di-
recting him to pay child support, he appealed on the ground that
the State’s use of peremptory challenges to dismiss male jurors
solely because of their sex violated the Equal Protection Clause and
prevented him from receiving a fair trial.216
The trial court rejected this claim, holding that Batson v. Ken-
tucky217 did not extend to gender-based peremptory challenges,
and the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed.218 The Supreme
Court of Alabama subsequently denied certiorari.219 The Supreme
Court, however, overturned the ruling of the Alabama Court of
Civil Appeals, and Justice Blackmun reaffirmed the last twenty-
three years of gender precedent.220 It must not have escaped Jus-
tice Blackmun’s notice that his opinion relied on the very gender
precedents that his new colleague, Justice Ginsburg, helped formu-
late.221 Nevertheless, he refused to revisit the issue of whether gen-
der classifications are per se suspect; in fact, he pointedly abstained
from declaring gender a suspect classification.222
Justice Blackmun was directly responding to Justice Ginsburg’s
Harris footnote, which was intended to reopen the debate regard-
ing the appropriate level of scrutiny for gender classifications.223
Whether the footnote was a collegial invitation to the Court to re-
visit the level of scrutiny for gender classifications or a more aggres-
sive declaration of one justice’s agenda, or a combination of the
two, Justice Ginsburg mysteriously did not follow through on either
her footnote or Justice Blackmun’s blunt refusal to settle the issue.
Instead she silently joined the majority. It makes little sense that
she should challenge intermediate scrutiny in a footnote and then
not revisit the issue at the next opportunity, especially considering
that gender discrimination cases do not frequently come before
the Court. Perhaps Justice Ginsburg felt that the time was not ripe
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that race-based peremptory challenges violated the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).
218 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129.
219 Id. at 130.
220 See id. at 139 n.11.
221 See id. at 135-36 (citing the Reed, Boren and Frontiero cases, among others).
222 Id. at 137 n.6 (noting that “we once again need not decide whether classifica-
tions based on gender are inherently suspect”).
223 See supra notes 180, 183 & 185 and accompanying text.
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to revisit the issue of scrutiny level and that more time was needed
to lay a friendlier foundation.
To some commentators, Justice Ginsburg’s decision to remain
silent constituted an abdication of her duty to use her position to
engage the Court in a discussion of important issues within gender
discrimination law.224 Certainly, a concurrence would not have
compromised her collegiality views, which prescribe the use of sep-
arate opinion writing to clarify affirmative statements of the law.225
Given that the Supreme Court has struggled in the past with the
level of scrutiny to attach to gender discrimination,226 Justice Black-
mun threw down the gauntlet by citing Justice Ginsburg’s Harris
footnote in which she supports the inclusion of gender as a suspect
classification. Readdressing the issue and maintaining a consistent
voice would have informed her colleagues that this was an issue
that needed to be addressed at some point and was not going away.
Another advantage to concurring could have been to lay the foun-
dation for incremental consensus-building. If Justice Ginsburg’s si-
lence may be explained by her reluctance to use her expertise in
the field of gender discrimination to lord over her colleagues, it is
unfortunate, for a strong voice was needed to remind the Court of
its gender precedents in light of the Court’s subsequent direction
in Miller and Nguyen.
2. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.227
In Oncale v. Sundowner, the Supreme Court revisited the issue
of what conduct constitutes sexual harassment, but this time in the
context of a man suing another man.228 In 1991, Joseph Oncale, a
self-identified heterosexual oilrig worker, was sexually harassed by
his heterosexual co-workers and supervisor on an oilrig off the
coast of Louisiana. He claimed that he was sexually assaulted, bat-
tered, touched and threatened with rape by his direct supervisor
and others, including one instance where three male co-workers
held him down in a shower and shoved a bar of soap between his
224 See Baugh et al., supra note 23, at 27.
225 See Judicial Voice, supra note 1, at 1196. Moreover, it is less clear whether Justice
Ginsburg is as skeptical of the concurring justice as she is of the dissenter. Her re-
marks focus more on the evils of prolific and vociferous dissenting, not of concurring.
226 Justice Brennan did not have a majority join his strict scrutiny reasoning in Fron-
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
Justice Ginsburg pushed for intermediate scrutiny following this decision. See supra
note 41 and accompanying text.
227 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
228 Id.
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buttocks.229 He sued under Title VII, claiming he was subjected to
a hostile work environment, but the lower courts denied his claim
since both he and his harassers were male.230 By unanimous vote,
the Supreme Court reinstated Oncale’s claim, stating that “nothing
in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination ‘because of
sex’ merely because the plaintiff and the defendant . . . are of the
same sex.”231
While the Oncale opinion was widely touted as expanding the
scope of protection of Title VII,232 the holding is limited in a way
that leaves open many questions of application. In response to the
concern that Title VII would expand into “a general civility code
for the American workplace,”233 the Court assured that even a
same-sex plaintiff “must always prove that the conduct at issue was
not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually
constituted ‘discrimination . . . because of sex.’”234 The Court then
proposed two possible evidentiary routes to support an inference
that a same-sex harassment plaintiff had been singled out for har-
assment on the basis of sex: (1) evidence that “a female victim is
harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another wo-
man as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general
hostility to the presence of women in the workplace;”235 and (2)
“direct comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser
treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.”236 These
examples, strikingly irrelevant to the conduct before the Court in-
volving harassment of a male in a male-dominated workplace, focus
exclusively on biological sex, limiting sexual harassment to situa-
tions where the harasser treats men as a group differently from
women as a group. Excluded from protection under this narrow
reading is the effeminate or sexually prudish man who is singled
229 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv. Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 119 (5th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 523
U.S. 75 (1998).
230 Id.
231 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
232 See, e.g., John Gallagher, Friends of the Court: Landmark Decisions on Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment and Marriage Side in Gays’ Favor, ADVOC.: NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN NEWS-
MAGAZINE 13 (Mar. 31, 1998); John Cloud, Harassed or Hazed?: Why the Supreme Court
Ruled that Men Can Sue Men for Sex Harassment, TIME, Mar. 16, 1998, at 55 (reporting
that “most lesbians and gays praised Scalia’s ruling” and that “feminists have
rejoiced”); Same-Gender Harassment is also Banned, 219 N.Y.L.J. 1 (March 5, 1998) (re-
ferring to the Oncale decision as “a case of enormous importance for American
workplaces”).
233 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
234 Id. at 81.
235 Id. at 80.
236 Id. at 80-81.
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out by his male coworkers or employers and teased, taunted, and
ridiculed because he does not conform to traditional and expected
gender roles.
Indeed, the Court’s ruling did not address whether Oncale
was in fact sexually harassed, leaving it to the lower courts to work
out what proof was required to establish that same-sex harassment
was “because of sex.” Oncale’s case was remanded and Oncale was
left to convince a jury that his co-workers and supervisor discrimi-
nated against him because of his sex. The parties ultimately settled
the case,237 so it remains unclear whether the Supreme Court’s rul-
ing would have helped Oncale. In fact, while the Oncale decision
allows the possibility of a same-sex sexual harassment claim, there
is no indication that the Court would recognize the right of such a
plaintiff based on the gender stereotyping that is typical of same-
sex sexual harassment. Accordingly, even if Oncale’s co-workers
did everything he said they did, he still might have lost his case on
remand.
Despite this lack of clarity and subtle limitation of the rights of
same-sex harassment plaintiffs, Justice Ginsburg signed on to the
majority opinion, foregoing an opportunity to provide additional
guidance in a case with particular gender equality implications. Jus-
tice Ginsburg surely had an interest in maintaining the force of a
unanimous court in an opinion widely believed to be an important
victory for same-sex harassment plaintiffs, particularly in light of
the fact that it was authored by Justice Scalia, one of the Court’s
arch-conservatives. A concurrence, however, would not have be-
trayed her strict principles regarding writing separately.
The examples enumerated by the Court, while not necessarily
exhaustive of the ways in which a same-sex harassment plaintiff can
prove that the harassment was “because of sex,” reflect rigid, con-
strained conceptions of “sex” and sex-based conduct. As many
courts below had done, the Court effectively bifurcated per-
sonhood into “male” and “female” components, attributing distinct
characteristics to men and women as if they applied universally and
without variation. By using “male” and “female” as opposing bina-
ries in its narrow interpretation of “sex,” the Court implicitly ac-
cepted the validity of biological sexual differences, perpetuating
the stereotyped distinctions between the sexes that Justice Gins-
burg famously abhors. Even if the “because of sex” requirement
were not meant to be interpreted in such a limited way, Justice
237 See Mary Judice, LA. Offshore Worker Settles Sex Suit: Harassment Case Made History
in Supreme Court, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 24, 1998, at C1.
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Ginsburg might, at a minimum have spoken out on the remarkable
lack of guidance for applying this requirement in an all-male work
environment.
She might also have argued for a more liberal interpretation
of Title VII’s “because of sex” language, so as to remain in line with
opposite-sex sexual harassment jurisprudence. In that context,
courts have long recognized that Title VII’s reference to conduct
based on an individual’s “sex” is, in essence, a reference to conduct
based on the individual’s gender identity, because gender identity
encompasses the socially-constructed and socially-relevant aspects
of an individual’s sex.238 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized in opposite-sex sexual harassment cases that conduct
based on gender-stereotyped notions of how an individual should
appear and behave, is, in effect, conduct based on the plaintiff’s
sex within the meaning of Title VII.239
The Oncale case presented an opportunity for Justice Ginsburg
to use a male litigant to advance her concern with gender equality
over women’s rights.240 Title VII was intended to lift all arbitrary
and capricious hurdles to employment and to afford employees
“the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory in-
timidation, ridicule, and insult.”241 Congresswoman May, arguing
in favor of the addition of “sex” in Title VII, described Title VII as
an “endeavor to have all persons, men and women, possess the
same rights and same opportunities.”242 By potentially limiting the
reach of Title VII protection to people who fail to conform to gen-
der stereotypes where the harasser is of the opposite sex, the Court
contravenes the explicit goals of the statute.
While strict adherence to the gender precedent set by the op-
posite-sex harassment cases might be expected from Justice Gins-
burg, given the great strides the Oncale Court had already taken in
238 Many courts have, in fact, used the word “gender” interchangeably with the
word “sex” in their analyses under Title VII. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec.
Co., 77 F.3d 745, 749 n.1 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 239-41 (1989)); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979);
Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977); Schoiber v. Emro
Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730, 734 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
239 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (affirming the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia’s finding of sex discrimination). Price Waterhouse had imper-
missibly discriminated on the basis of “sex” when it “acted on the basis of gender” by
penalizing the plaintiff for failing to walk, talk, dress and groom herself “more femi-
ninely.” Id. at 235, 240.
240 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
241 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
242 Waag v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick, GMC, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393, 400 n.5 (D. Minn.
1996) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577, 2583 (1964)).
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reconciling the body of law governing same-sex harassment claims,
she may have felt it would be too far-reaching to enumerate the
scope of the “because of sex” requirement more precisely. The
Court recognized that sex-based harassment, like other forms of
sex-based discrimination, is actionable irrespective of the sex of the
plaintiff or the sex of the perpetrator, and acknowledged that con-
duct need not be based on sexual desire to be based on sex. In
doing so, the Court, in several important respects, reconciled the
same-sex sexual harassment doctrine with established standards for
adjudicating sexual harassment claims. In light of Justice Gins-
burg’s incremental approach to decision-making, it is possible she
chose to leave more radical developments for another day.
3. Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education
In 1999, the Supreme Court decided another school sexual
harassment case, but this time involving two students. Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education243 was a sex discrimination lawsuit
brought by the mother of LaShonda Davis who was sexually
harassed by G.F., a fifth grade classmate.244 Sitting behind her in
the classroom, in physical education class, and in the hallways, G.F.
would try to touch her breasts and vaginal area saying, “I want to
get in bed with you” and “I want to feel your boobs.”245 He rubbed
his body against hers in the hallways, put a doorstop in his pants,
and pretended to have sex with her during physical education
class.246 LaShonda complained about each incident, but neither
her teachers nor the elementary school’s principal responded.247
Davis tried to get away from G.F. by asking for her seat assignment
to be changed, but it was three months before the teacher let her
move.248 Even then, G.F., who was never disciplined by the school,
continued to sexually harass her in the hallways.249 She told her
mother that she “didn’t know how long she could keep him off
her,” and worried that the only way she could get him to stop
would be to kill herself.250 It was the criminal justice system, not the
school, that finally put an end to the harassment: G.F. was arrested
for sexual battery and he pled guilty to the charge in juvenile
243 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
244 Id. at 633.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 634.
247 Id. at 635.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 634.
250 Id.
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court.251
A divided Supreme Court affirmed the legal obligation of
schools to protect students from severe and pervasive sexual harass-
ment by other students.252 The decision, authored by Justice
O’Connor, with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer join-
ing, recognizes that student-on-student sexual harassment disrupts
a student’s ability to learn. The Court, however, applied the same
stringent standard it adopted in Gebser, holding that a school board
may be held liable only where it exhibits “deliberate indifference”
to sexual harassment of which it has actual knowledge.253 The
Court again rejected the use of agency principles, which it freely
applied in the employment context, to impute liability to the
school board–the school board will only be liable for “its own deci-
sion to remain idle in the face of known student-on-student harass-
ment in its schools.”254 Like the Gebser case, while recognizing the
problems associated with harassment of a student, the Court actu-
ally imposed higher standards on students suing for sexual harass-
ment than on similarly situated adult employees.255
Justice Kennedy, in a dissent that Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas joined, disagreed with the majority’s
assertion that a school “subjects” its students to discrimination
when it knows of peer harassment and fails to respond appropri-
ately.256 He pointed out that a violation of Title IX does not occur
any time a student is subjected to discrimination, but rather, the
student must be “subjected to discrimination under [an] education
program or activity.”257 To impose liability under Title IX, the dis-
crimination must actually be controlled by the school.258 Whereas a
teacher’s conduct, in some cases, may be authorized by the school
or be in accordance with its policies, a student’s conduct “cannot
be said to be ‘under’ the school’s program or activity as required
by Title IX.”259 Justice Kennedy pointed out that “[m]ost public
schools do not screen or select students, and their power to disci-
pline students is far from unfettered.”260 Accordingly, the dissent-
ers, who espoused the rule in Gebser that could potentially impute
251 Id.
252 Id. at 633.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 641.
255 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
256 Davis, 526 U.S. at 658 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
257 Id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)).
258 Id. at 660 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
259 Id. at 661 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
260 Id. at 664 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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liability on the school district for a teacher’s misconduct, would
apply a more stringent rule in the case of student misconduct.
Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, the four jus-
tices who signed on to Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion, found
themselves in an anomalous position. Presumably, they signed on
to the majority because they agreed with the result–a valid damages
claim was stated against the school board. However, the standard
adopted by the majority opinion is the same standard these four
justices opposed in the Gebser case, which was also authored by Jus-
tice O’Connor. These justices dissented in Gebser because of the
majority’s failure to interpret Title IX consistently with well estab-
lished agency principles, but they subsequently signed on to a ma-
jority opinion espousing the same interpretation of Title IX.
Had these justices not signed on to Justice O’Connor’s opin-
ion or had they concurred in judgment only, the majority opinion
would have turned into a plurality opinion with no precedential
weight. While their views on the Gebser and Davis cases can not eas-
ily be reconciled and their position in the Davis case may seem
unprincipled, it may have been their only means to secure Justice
O’Connor’s swing vote.
IV. CONCLUSION
In eight gender discrimination cases heard by the Supreme
Court over the last ten years, Justice Ginsburg has deftly managed
to navigate the fine line between advocating for the rejection of
gender-role stereotypes that repress women and maintaining col-
legiality among judges, proving that her twin objectives of gender
equality and collegiality are not mutually exclusive.
Despite her desire to foster cooperation among judges and
her distaste for separate opinions written to satisfy personal ego,
Justice Ginsburg has been surprisingly assertive in writing concur-
ring and dissenting opinions. During her first nine terms she ex-
ceeded the Court’s average for dissents and was above average for
concurrences in five terms, often to advance her agenda of gender
equality.261 She authored the majority opinion of a landmark gen-
der discrimination case with an expansive view of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause,262 and has spoken out on issues ranging from the
261 Ray, supra note 69, at 673-74, 654; see also Smith et al., supra note 180, at 78
(stating that during Justice Ginsburg’s first term, “[w]ith respect to concurring opin-
ions, she was tied for third among all justices in the frequency of explaining her views
when she agreed with the outcome of a case but did not write the majority opinion.”).
262 See U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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improper use of gender classifications based on stereotypes,263 to
whether sex-based classifications are inherently suspect.264 She con-
tinues in her tradition of advocating for legal rules that can be ap-
plied neutrally to either sex,265 and has hinted that, despite the
importance of precedent, judicial standards are not set in stone.266
Primarily, she has written separately to point out an unwar-
ranted deviation from precedent, as in the Miller case,267 or to re-
solve an issue unresolved by the lead opinion, as in Gebser.268 She
has advocated overruling precedent only in unique circumstances.
In one unusual case, she wrote separately to lay the groundwork for
future consideration of the intermediate scrutiny standard cur-
rently adopted for gender classifications,269 an issue she had fought
for in incremental steps over the course of her career. Because this
would overrule years of established precedent and was beyond the
scope of her typical separate opinion, she advocated this change in
a footnote. Subsequently, she has been hesitant to follow up on the
issue in later cases.
At the same time, her judicial style has generated “balanced,
intelligent opinions reflecting a profound sense and respect for
precedent.”270 In style, she has been consistent in maintaining a
narrow focus in her separate opinions, pointing out differences
and failures of the lead opinion without undermining public confi-
dence in the judiciary. Indeed, her Burlington concurrence was so
brief it teetered on defeating the purpose for writing separately.271
She has exercised restraint when developing new doctrine, going
only so far as necessary for the case at hand, and building upon
previous precedent whenever possible. She speaks in a temperate
voice and emphasizes points of agreement whenever applicable.272
With one exception, Justice Ginsburg has abstained from forcefully
critiquing her colleagues’ legal reasoning.273
In deference to her collegiality philosophy, however, she has,
263 See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
264 See Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 26 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
265 See Miller, 523 U.S. at 460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
266 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 26 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
267 See Miller, 523 U.S. at 469-70 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
268 See Gebser, 524 U.S. 274, 307 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
269 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 26 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
270 Kushner, supra note 36, at 184.
271 See Burlington, 524 U.S. at 766 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
272 See, e.g., Harris, 510 U.S. at 26 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Burlington, 524 U.S. at
766 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
273 See Miller, 523 U.S. at 460-71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (uncharacteristically cit-
ing and deconstructing Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court).
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on occasion, slighted her other long-standing passion–gender
equality. In those cases where she did not write separately, she for-
feited the opportunity to advance the dialogue on gender equality
that she had put on the table,274 or to put the Court and the public
on notice that precedent had been dangerously subverted.275 Jus-
tice Ginsburg’s lack of consistency as a vocal gender advocate has
the potential to undermine her future separate opinions because
she has unwittingly sent the message that she will not always follow
through on her admonitions to her colleagues. She also failed to
take several opportunities to clarify rules set forth in a majority
opinion,276 and in one case, she even signed on to a majority opin-
ion that applied a rule to which she had previously objected.277
On balance, Justice Ginsburg has maintained fidelity to her
twin philosophies of collegiality and gender equality jurisprudence.
Although only one voice amongst nine, her moderate tendency on
the Court, both in substance and tone, has softened the intemper-
ateness of some of her colleagues. Her decorum is rare in an era
that prizes bold declarations over reflection and serves as a stan-
dard many in the law and media would do well to emulate and
which could further an enlightened dialogue on such lightning
rod topics as abortion and same-sex marriage.
274 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 137 n.6 (1994), where Justice
Ginsburg failed to write a separate concurring opinion although Justice Blackmun
publicly refused to address and thus resolve the Harris footnote.
275 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
276 See, e.g., id.
277 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
